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Law and a New Land Ethic
John A. Humbach*
As open space comes under increasing development pressure, ex-
isting-use zoning provides a direct and forthright way to preserve the
line between urban and non-urban land use. Ultimately it may be the
only practical means for protecting high-demand or sensitive areas
such as wetlands, coastlines, lakeshores, floodplains, stream corridors,
and pristine reservoir watersheds. This Article reviews the viability
of existing-use zoning under United States Supreme Court interpreta-
tions of the Constitution's takings clause. It concludes that nothing in
those interpretations disallows this straightforward approach to pre-
serving our country's familiar patterns of land use and development
When the settlers came to colonize America, they came for
land - for land to practice their faith, land to escape the heavy
hand of hierarchy, and land to call their own. Beyond a doubt
they prized the land to call their own. When the thirteen colo-
nies organized the United States, their Bill of Rights included
no fewer than four separate provisions aimed specifically at
protecting private interests in property.'
One of the new nation's first imperatives was to populate
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Pace Uni-
versity School of Law.
1. The third amendment limits the federal government's power to quar-
ter soldiers "in any house, without the consent of the Owner." U.S. CONST.
amend. III. The fourth amendment protects "the right of the people to be se-
cure in their persons, houses, papers and effects." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The fifth amendment provides two general property protections: the require-
ment of due process before government action deprives a person of property,
and the requirement of just compensation when the government takes private
property for public use. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The Supreme Court also has applied the contract clause of the Constitu-
tion, art. I, § 10, to protect private property interests from government inter-
ference. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470, 502 (1987) (noting that "[p]rior to the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, [the contract clause] was ... the primary constitutional check on
state legislative power"); Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 396-403
(1926) (holding that the city's attempt to promote navigation over tidal prop-
erty previously conveyed by the city to individuals was unconstitutional im-
pairment of contract); ef Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 60-65 (1902)
(reasoning that state law changing statute of limitations for property owners'
ground rent claims did not unconstitutionally impair contracts reserving rent
as long as owners had an opportunity to preserve their rights).
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the vast western spaces, to harness the wilderness to the arts of
humankind. Americans did not want their land to stay the way
it was. As pioneers pushed the frontier westward, their shared
vision of the future was progress through change. Decisions
about where and how to alter the land were, and still mostly
are, left to individual owners. The nation was built by private
initiatives on privately held land.2 The American land ethic
grew as an ethic of owner autonomy and change.
The American landscape has been transformed. Instead of
a great wilderness, America's land is now a groomed and clut-
tered place. The remnant wild lands lie in isolated bits in the
east and in larger fragments farther west.3 The natural
landbase that supported roughly one million native americans
is today a greatly modified resource that supports nearly 250
million. But we can no longer live from the natural land.4
2. See generally COUNCIL ON ENvTL. QUALITY, 1985 ENVTL. QUALITY:
THE SIXTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALrTY 33-54
(1985), noting that:
[Tihe main policy thrust into the early 20th century was to transfer
land from federal ownership to private individuals, developers and se-
lected industries such as ralroads .... [The goals for the land trans-
fers were] largely left to the new owners and developers, and the
workings of the free marketplace....
... Congress clearly believed the vast public domain would be
more valuable to the growing nation if it were transferred to the
hands of those who could develop it. There was no detailed plan for
development prepared by economists, scientists, or anyone else....
The main guidelines appear to have been that the lands should be set-
tled rapidly, at little or no cost to settlers, and that the new ownership
should be predominantly private and widely distributed.
Id at 35, 38.
3. Wilderness lands designated within the National Wilderness Preserva-
tion System total about 90 million acres in 474 units ranging in size from 36
acres to over 7 million acres. A Twenty-fifth Anniversary Vision for the Fu-
ture of the Nation's Wilderness, 52 WILDERNESS No. 184 at 6 (Spring 1989) (in-
cluding map insert showing locations). Many other wild and semi-wild lands
still remain. In contrast, the 48 contiguous states include 1.3 billion acres de-
voted to crops, grasslands, pastures, range, and "other" uses, including urban,
transportation, parks, defense, and industrial. COUNcIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY,
supra note 2, at 40.
4. Were it not for enormous infusions of petroleum, for example, the
American landbase already might not be able to feed the people who populate
it. The finite petroleum resource plays several key roles in enhancing agricul-
tural productivity: It fuels farm machinery and fertilizer production, see
WORLDWATCH INST., 1987 STATE OF THE WORLD 130-32 (1987), and is essential
for transporting food products from farms to population centers. Id at 51.
After millenia of living off our "income" (the world's renewable re-
sources), human population has reached the point where survival requires an
ever greater depletion of our planet's non-renewable "capital" - something
[Vol. 74:339
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As the character of the land has evolved, so too has the vi-
sion of the future. Now, more and more, neighbors view devel-
opment with suspicion and even hostility. "Excessive"
development conjures up images of cities sprawling until their
suburbs meet, swallowing up the countryside in between.5
Americans increasingly would like to keep our country looking
much the way it is - to harness not the dwindling wild lands
but rather the bulldozers of land profiteers.6 To many, in
short, the old land ethic of autonomy and change no longer can
produce the best results. A new land ethic, an ethic of planning
and stability, has emerged.7
As the new land ethic has gained momentum, citizens have
pressed to share in the decisions about growth. The spread of
zoning and environmental regulation8 is proof that the Ameri-
can landbase is seen, more than ever, as a shared resource of
all. The permanence and immobility of land make it a very
that cannot, presumably, go on forever. R. ORNSTEIN & P. EHRLICH, NEW
WORLD NEW MnD 45-48 (1989).
5. In the thirty-one county area around New York City, for example, the
amount of developed land increased by more than 30% between 1964 and 1985,
while the population grew only 5%. REGIONAL PLAN Ass'N, WHERE THE PAvE-
MENT ENDS 4, 14 (1987).
6. For a discussion of some of the origins of concern and variety of
problems associated with inadequately controlled development, see R. HEALY,
LAND USE AND THE STATES 4-6, 15-34 (2d ed. 1976). The competing views on
land use reform also receive detailed description in F. POPPER, THE POLITICS
OF LAND-USE REFORM 56-75 (1981). Popper notes, in one colorful example,
that horrified Oregonians even coined a new term, "Californication," to de-
scribe "the California-style destruction of the environment" that they see as
threatening to creep up the coast from the south. I at 58.
7. According to Aldo Leopold "[a]n ethic is a differentiation of social
from anti-social conduct." A. LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC WITH
OTHER ESSAYS ON CONSERVATION FROM ROUND RIVER 217-18 ([Ballantine]
1966). Leopold's essay criticizes the traditional land-use ethic "still governed
wholly by economic self-interest." Id. at 224. He advocates instead a land ethic
under which all living "members of the land community... should continue
as a matter of biotic right, regardless of the presence or absence of economic
advantage to us." Id. at 226.
The new land ethic referred to in the text, an ethic of planning and stabil-
ity, is neither the old ethic criticized by Leopold nor, precisely, the new one
proposed by him. It is, however, clearly more compatible with the latter: Peo-
ple no longer find it so easy to believe that "the parable of the talents teaches
us that undeveloped land is a sin." P. JAMIESON, ADIRONDACK CANOE WA-
TERs: NORTH FLOW 92 (2d ed. 1984) (quoting Kenneth Durant).
8. See D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND
DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAw 378-80 (2d ed. 1986); see also Kusler, Regulating
Sensitive Lands: An Overview of Programs, in LAND USE ISSUES OF THE 1980s
128-53 (1983) (describing some approaches in the reported 94 new development
control statutes enacted between 1965 and 1977).
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special kind of commodity. Decisions about land use effectively
determine for everyone what our communities and countryside
will look like and the quality of life that our land will sustain.
The use of private land is never an entirely private affair.
Although citizens may react negatively toward particular
projects, both the population and the demand for material con-
sumption grow. Development is inevitable because developers
are entrepreneurs whose products all enjoy. The real issue is
not whether to develop but where. The need is not to stymie
growth but to create comprehensive land-use plans that will
maintain a balance between open lands and areas of more ur-
banized use.
The development expectations of land entrepreneurs often
present a significant challenge to the aspirations of the new
land ethic.9 The conflict is rooted in our tradition that all pri-
vate land presumptively is fair game for some type of "improve-
ment" or another. At least partly because of this conflict, no
doubt, comprehensive planning in the United States usually has
not included planning for privately owned permanent open
space.10 Despite the general embrace of land use planning, re-
strictions on land use still are sometimes seen as contrary to
the fundamental premise of land ownership.1' Americans still
prize having a place to call their own, and we do not like to
share the decisions on how we should use our particular pieces
of the national landbase.' 2
9. See generally R. HEALY, ENVIRONMENTALISTS AND DEVELOPERS: CAN
THEY AGREE ON ANYTHING? 1-5 (1977) (discussing efforts of environmentalists
and developers to blame each other for national housing problems, and calling
for joint problem solving).
10. See F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A. TARLocK, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION 795-96 (1984) (discussing changing role of land use regulations
from the early 1900s, when society viewed increases in land use density as de-
sirable and inevitable, to the late 1900s, when society focused instead on pres-
ervation of natural qualities of the ecological environment). For an excellent
review of open-space zoning, see 5 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW
§§ 157.01-158.42, at 383-529 (rev. ed. 1985).
11. See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 265 (1985) (emphasizing that "[z]oning stands in stark contrast to a
system of private property, which allows a single owner... to decide how to
use his plot of land"); see also id at 63-73, 263-73 (criticizing Supreme Court's
eminent domain cases for failing to recognize the essential incidents of owner-
ship: possession and use); B. SIEGEN, PLANNING WITHOUT PRICEs 29-38 (1977)
(arguing that land use regulation adversely affect individual property rights);
cases cited infra note 13.
12. In a highly critical jurisprudential appraisal of American land-use
laws, Professor Lynton K. Caldwell observed that "no other society appears to
have gone so far in leaving the fate of the land to the discretion of the private
"342 [Vol. 74:339
EXISTING-USE ZONING
Strong claims are made for private rights to control private
land.' 3 Litigants and legal commentators seriously debate
whether governmental bodies, by mere regulation, can constitu-
tionally require owners to preserve longstanding patterns of
land use and open space.14 The protection of property rights in
owner." Caldwell, Rights of Ownership or Rights of Use? - The Need for a
New Conceptual Basis for Land Use Policy, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 759, 762
(1974). Caldwell concludes, however, that the benefits of this system are
mixed, working mostly to the detriment of those whose preference is stability:
"The present status of land ownership ... is beneficial chiefly to developers
and speculators .... [To the individual home owner mere ownership offers
little more than the illusion of security." I&c at 767.
13. MTc at 767. Recent cases narrowly interpreting the government's power
to restrict land to open space use include: A.A. Profiles, Inc. v. City of Ft. Lau-
derdale, 850 F.2d 1483, 1483 (11th Cir. 1988) (a civil rights action holding that
city ordinance rezoning property to prohibit industrial use was unconstitu-
tional taking where property owner was previously authorized to put such
property to individual use); Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d
893, 904 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (suggesting that depriving owner of right to fill wet-
lands may be a taking because "the balancing of public and private interests
reveals a private interest much more deserving of compensation"). Loveladies
Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 396 (1988) (suggesting that depriv-
ing owner of right to fill wetlands may be a taking unless owner has some re-
maining use); Karches v. City of Cincinnati, 38 Ohio St. 3d 12, 21, 526 N.E.2d
1350, 1357 (1988) (reasoning that riverfront zoning ordinance that changed
classification of property to prohibit commercial use was an unconstitutional
taking because it denied the owner beneficial use and did not advance substan-
tially a legitimate state interest); Allingham v. City of Seattle, 109 Wash. 2d
947, 952, 749 P.2d 160, 163 (1988) (holding that ordinance requiring private
owners to retain or restore certain lots to their natural state effected a taking).
The Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed this issue.
14. For authority supporting the government's power to restrict land use
to open space, see Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374, 1381-82
(Fla.) (upholding ban on wetlands development where proposed use would ad-
versely impact environment), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981); Sibson v. State,
115 N.H. 124, 126-30, 336 A.2d 239, 240-43 (1975) (reasoning that denial of per-
mit to fill salt marshland was within state's police power and "did not depreci-
ate the value of the marshland"); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 17-18,
201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (1972) (stating that "an owner of land has no absolute and
unlimited right to change the essential natural character of his land"); see also
F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALUEs & J. BANTA, TiE TAKINGS ISSUE: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE CONsTrruTIONAL LIMITS OF LAND USE CONTROL 168-75 (1973) (the classic
study of land use regulation since colonial times, concluding that the "myth"
of the takings clause limits regulation far more than actual court decisions);
Torres, Wetlands and Agriculture: Environmental Regulation and the Limits
of Private Property, 34 U. KAN. L. REV. 539, 553-62 (1986) (setting forth con-
flicting case law. For authority casting doubt on government's power to re-
strict land use to open space, see cases cited supra note 13; see also Wilkins,
The Takings Clause: A Modern Plot for an Old Constitutional Tale, 64 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1, 3 (1989) (arguing that Supreme Court's "lax construction of
the takings clause demands correction"); Klock & Cook, The Condemning of
America: Regulatory "Takings" and the Purchase by the United States of
America's Wetlands, 18 SETON HALL L. REV. 330, 339-54 (1988) (discussing in-
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the Constitution's takings clause' 5 is seen as a barrier to regula-
tions that would preserve private land "as is."' 6 If these claims
are well-founded then American land use planning may have
reached its constitutional limit. The new land ethic may run
aground on fundamental law.
These claims, however, are extravagant. No such private
sovereignty in the use of land was ever premised in law, cer-
tainly not in the common law with its sic utere tuo ut alienum
non laedes.17 The claims, moreover, are inconsistent with the
social obligation of property that is inherent in the structure of
American law.
PROPERTY LAWS AS PUBLIC INTEREST LAWS
It is a fundamental axiom of American constitutionalism
that government exists to serve the public good. It is empow-
creased governmental regulation protecting nation's wetlands, and Supreme
Court decisions holding that such regulations are takings when they deny
owners a viable economic use of their land).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. V reads, in pertinent part: "nor shall private
property be taken for public use without just compensation." Although widely
regarded as a doctrinal patchwork, the Supreme Court's holdings under the so-
called takings clause are in fact an operationally coherent body of law, as I
have described previously in Humbach, A Unifying Theory for the Just-Com-
pensation Cases: Takings, Regulation and Public Use, 34 RUTGERS L. REv. 243,
279-89 (1982).
16. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 13. A regulation limiting land use can
result in a compensable taking under the fifth amendment even if the regula-
tion does not take away ownership or title as such. In the last ten years, the
Supreme Court has fixed upon two oft-repeated tests that determine whether
particular actions of government effect a compensable taking.
One of these formulations states that a land-use regulation will result in a
compensable taking if it "does not substantially advance legitimate state inter-
ests, or denies an owner economically viable use of his land." Agins v.
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (citation omitted). In its other formulation,
the Court attaches "particular significance" to three factors: "the economic im-
pact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment backed ex-
pectations, and the character of the governmental action." Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); see also Humbach, Economic Due Pro-
cess and the Takings Clause, 4 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 311, 317-23 (1987) (discuss-
ing relationship between the two takings tests).
17. "Use what is yours so that others are not injured" for centuries has
been the fundamental maxim of the law regulating the relations of landown-
ers who share the same physical environment. See generally R. POSNER, Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.5, at 42-43 (1986) (stating that "property rights are
not really exclusive in the sense of giving the owner of a resource the absolute
right to do with it what he will"). For a discussion of the modern law of nui-
sance, see D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 94-106 (2d ed. 1988); W. PROSSER &
W. KEETON, TORTS 616-30 (stud. ed. 1984).
[Vol. 74:339
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ered to enact laws only in the public interest. 8 Property rights
are the creations of laws,' 9 and the law of property must, like
all other law, serve a public purpose.
Because property law exists to serve the public good, the
legal contours of private ownership do not necessarily include
everything that yields a private economic advantage.2 ° On the
contrary, legal property rights are shaped and limited by the
many competing needs of the general welfare. 21 The legislative
18. "[T]o justify the state in thus interposing its authority on behalf of the
public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distin-
guished from those of a particular class, require such interference." Lawton v.
Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894); see also Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 142-
44 (1912) (reasoning that a statute giving certain property owners the power to
establish building lines at their discretion is outside the state's police power
because the statute permitted owners to act solely for their own interest);
Northwest Paper Co. v. Federal Power Conm'n, 344 F.2d 47, 51 (8th Cir. 1965)
(citing Reicheldorfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315, 321 (1932), for the proposition that
"[s]tatutes said to restrict the power of the government by the creation of pri-
vate rights are, like other public grants, to be strictly construed for the protec-
tion of the public interest").
Although a monarchy, for example, might exist to serve purely private in-
terests, this discussion assumes that American governmental bodies, state and
federal, may not. The so-called guarantee clause, which "guarantees" a repub-
lican form of government, may provide textual support for this assumption.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. Because the guarantee clause is non-justiciable, how-
ever, we do not have the advantage of definitive judicial exposition of its con-
tent. See J. NOwAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 108 (3d
ed. 1986).
19. "Before laws were made, there was no property; take away laws and
property ceases." J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 113 (5th ed. 1887).
The fact of possession existed before property laws, but this differs signifi-
cantly from the legal right to property. Possession in fact - simple, deliberate
dominion and control - requires no legal imprimatur to exist, and considera-
tions of public good or general welfare do not limit its existence. By the same
token, however, the law does not protect absolutely the fact of possession.
Rather, possession is protected only conditionally, under those circumstances
provided by the law of property.
Various other sources of property may be conceivable philosophically -
such as custom, sociobiology, or the divine - but law protects only the legal
rights of property.
20. The mere fact that an economic interest may be valuable does not
make it a property right. "[Not all economic interests are 'property rights';
only those economic advantages are 'rights' which have the law back of them,
and only when they are so recognized may courts compel others to forbear
from interfering with them or to compensate for their invasion." United
States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502-03 (1945).
The Court in Willow River held that private riparian rights in navigable
streams are not co-extensive with the economic advantages of riparian owner-
ship. Id. The owner's legally protected title is qualified by the paramount pub-
lic interest, in this instance the public interest in navigation. Id. at 507.
21. As Justice Holmes stated in Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter,
209 U.S. 349 (1908):
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and common law delimiters of private owners' autonomy, taken
together, are a social obligation of property that legally quali-
fies the private property right.22
To say that the law's protection of private property must
promote public ends certainly does not mean that property
rights do not exist to serve private concerns. Sometimes - and
the domain of property is an archetypal instance - the public
interest can best be served only by advancing private interests.
This may occur because private economic pursuits tend to bene-
fit the public secondarily,2 3 and it occurs whenever particular
kinds of private interest are so widely shared as to make them
prime objects of governmental protection.24 Indeed, to govern
All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical ex-
treme. Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of
policy which are other than those on which the particular right is
founded .... The limits set to property by other public interests pres-
ent themselves as a branch of what is called the police power of the
State. It sometimes is difficult to fix boundary stones between the
private right of property and the police power, . . . [b]ut it is recog-
nized that the State... has standing in the courts to protect the at-
mosphere, the water and the forests within its territory, irrespective of
the assent or dissent of the private owners of the land most immedi-
ately concerned.
Id at 355 (emphasis added).
22. "[AIll property in this country is held under the implied obligation
that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community." Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887) (citing Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25,
32 (1877)).
"[I]n instances in which a state tribunal reasonably concluded that 'the
health, safety, morals, or general welfare would be promoted by prohibiting
particular contemplated uses of land, this Court has upheld land-use regula-
tions that destroyed or adversely affect recognized real property interests."
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978).
The social obligation of property implicit in the United States Constitution
is explicit in other constitutions, for example, the more recently written con-
stitution of the Federal Republic of Germany: "Property entails obligation.
Its use shall also serve the public good." GRUNDGESETZ [GG] (CONSTITUTION)
(W. GER.), art. 14, § 2, translated and quoted in R. DOLZER, PROPERTY AND EN-
vIRONmENT, THE SocIAL OBLIGATION INHERENT IN OWNERSHIP 17 (Interna-
tional Union for the Conservation of Nature Environmental Policy and Law
Paper No. 12, 1976).
For an excellent comprehensive review of the history and modern judicial
recognition of the social obligation of property, see Anderson, Takings and Ex-
pectations: Toward a "Broader Vision" of Property Rights, 37 U. KAN. L. REV.
529, 531 (1989) (suggesting that "the expectations of all property owners must
include the element of public welfare").
23. See Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 161 (1896) (ap-
proving taxpayer subsidies to a private irrigation supply, reasoning that "to
bring into cultivation these large masses of otherwise worthless lands would
seem to be a public purpose... not confined to the landowners").
24. Cf. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (reason-
[Vol. 74:339
EXISTING-USE ZONING
in the public interest - "adjusting the benefits and burdens of
economic life to promote the common good"' ' - may precisely
mean to choose which private interests to favor.26
Judging from the near universality of private property
rights, it is safe to conclude that some extremely compelling
public interests are advanced by the creation and protection of
legal property. Foremost perhaps is the public interest in eco-
nomic efficiency. People more likely will sow when they are
assured that they can reap and enjoy the fruits of their efforts.
The alternative, true communal ownership, also has the disad-
vantage of providing an incentive to abuse resources. 27 Finally,
private property rights serve the important interest everyone
has in privacy itself, by providing an exclusive place of resort
for home and rest.
The public interests advanced by private property auton-
omy are not, however, the only legitimate public interests that
should be served by government. The interests advanced by
owner autonomy are not even the only legitimate public inter-
ests relating to privately held land. There is, for example, the
interest shared by all in the appearance and character of our
national landbase, in the quality of life that it can provide, and
most importantly, in its ability to sustain our population. The
social obligation of property promotes those public interests
that purely private rights cannot.28
Where the private autonomy of ownership would clash
with the greater public good, that is where the private rights in
ing that even though "[t]his is the case of a single private house ... [n]o doubt
there is a public interest even in this").
25. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
26. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1929) (holding that "the
state does not exceed its constitutional powers by deciding upon the destruc-
tion of one class of property in order to save another which, in the judgment of
the legislature, is of greater value to the public").
27. Hardin's eloquent treatment of this problem probably is the most fa-
mous. Hardin, Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
28. Private allocations of property rights fail to address problems of eco-
nomic externalities and "market failure" (due to high transactions costs) that
prevent many costs and benefits of economic choices from being accurately
weighed. See Calabresi & Melamud, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Ina-
lienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106-15 (1972)
(noting the need to qualify and supplement purely property entitlements with
liability rules and inalienability rules [non-tradeable government regulatory
protections] in order to achieve many societal goals); see also Hunter, An Eco-
logical Perspective on Property: A Call for Judicial Protection of the Public's
Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources, 12 HARv. ENVT. L. REV. 311,
313 (1988) (arguing that the "external ecological effects private land-use deci-
sions can have" also must be considered in takings cases).
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property come to an end and the social obligation of property
begins. Were it not for this public interest boundary on private
property rights, the laws created to protect property could be-
come powerful instruments to defeat public welfare. A govern-
ment empowered to act only in the public interest never could
have constitutionally conferred such an extensive measure of
property ownership.2 9
In the discussion that follows, the chief concern is the limi-
tations that the takings clause of the Constitution imposes on
the government's legislative power to contain and channel land
development. The interests that the takings clause protects are
legal rights in property.30 The axiom of discussion is that the
legal rights of property are bounded by the public interest.
EXISTING-USE ZONING AND LANDSCAPE
PRESERVATION
Even in regions of comparatively dense population, most
land could be used more intensively. Vestigial open space still
stretches between urban centers. True megalopolises, with sub-
urbs stretching end-to-end for hundreds of miles, may be
America's destiny, but that destiny is not here yet. If there is
29. It does not follow, of course, that the courts should perform reviews of
property rights and strike down those found to be excessive. Ordinarily the
elected legislatures, or administrative bodies acting pursuant to legislative au-
thority, determine where and how to strike the balance between private and
public interests. Nevertheless, for constitutional purposes, the concept of
property hardly can be deemed to include measures of private sovereignty that
should have been beyond the power of a public-interest government to confer
originally - even if judicial review is unavailable to attack the excesses af-
firmatively.
In sum, legislative or judicial acts that curtail private advantages for the
public good should raise no questions under the takings clause if the law pur-
porting to confer the particular advantages would otherwise impermissibly
abridge the public interest. Laws beyond the scope of legislative power can
confer no private rights, so there is nothing to be taken.
30. For purposes of the fifth amendment, the definition of property "will
normally obtain its content by reference to local law." United States ex reL
TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 279 (1943); see Oregon ex reL State Land Bd. v.
Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 378 (1977) (applying local law rule
to riparian lands); United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315, 320 (1876) (holding that
state law determines the validity of devise of real property); see also
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980) (stating that "nor
as a general proposition is the United States, as opposed to the several states,
possessed of residual authority that enables it to define 'property' in the first
instance"). The Constitution itself neither creates nor defines the dimensions
of property interests. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
If the Constitution protects non-legal "rights" as property, the Supreme
Court has been notably silent about it.
[Vol. 74:339
EXISTING-USE ZONING
the will to do so, Americans still can preserve the essential
character of our communities, regions, and nation.31
Traditional zoning serves the goals of consolidating like
uses and separating incompatible uses, but zoning traditionally
has not been employed to channel development away from cer-
tain areas altogether. To save the familiar countryside and the
natural areas between developed centers, new building activity
must be directed away from the open terrain: It must be
steered into, or next to, those places where development exists
already. Development never will be geographically contained,
however, if we continue to rely on individual initiatives to de-
cide where our land is developed. If the trends to date are a
guide, random fragments of development eventually will crop
up almost everywhere unless something is done to keep our
larger open areas in their existing uses.
Zoning codes designed for cities and other developed cen-
ters are typically a complex of detailed use, minimum area, and
structural restrictions.32 Their complexity is necessary to ra-
tionalize development in locales that are accepted as being sub-
ject to dynamic land-use change. By contrast, existing-use
zoning can be as simple as a regulatory prescription that,
within the existing-use zone, the lawful uses of each piece of
land are the uses for which the parcel already is reasonably
adapted. The place for existing-use zoning is not in cities but in
non-urbanized settings, where the planning objective is to avoid
dynamic changes in patterns of land use. Existing-use zoning is
suited, in other words, to those relatively undisturbed locales
31. The concern at hand is the mix between undeveloped and developed
land, not other socio-economic characteristics of land use patterns such as the
mix between rich and poor or the racial mix of land users. Traditional land
use planning devices such as zoning have proven unfortunately effective in
perpetuating racial, economic, or other invidious discrimination - for exam-
ple, by imposing large lot size requirements that allow some to enter while
creating prohibitive barriers to others. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-
501 (1974) (holding that non-residents lack standing to challenge such barri-
ers); F. POPPER, supra note 6, at 11 (noting that "many relatively wealthy
white suburban communities also used their zoning laws to keep out unwanted
minorities and the poor"). The problem of invidious discrimination ultimately
can be addressed only by appropriately prescribing what kinds of development
should occur in those areas selected for development (affordable housing,
mixed income housing, or other options). This Article instead concerns the
means to enforce a governmental decision that any development at all is inap-
propriate for some land areas, and accordingly development should be chan-
nelled to other areas better suited for growth.
32. See generally D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 8, at 20,
39-88, 190-97 (discussing the history and future of zoning, sources of zoning
power, and the purposes and types of zoning).
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where the normal presumption runs against active modifica-
tions of land use anyway.
Even admitting the possibilities for rezoning and variances,
existing-use zoning effectively shifts the burden of justification
when owners apply to modify the uses of their land. Existing-
use zoning places the burden on those who stand to profit by
imposing change rather than on those who wish to retain the
character and qualities of the land. This shift, in itself, is a ma-
jor advance over the traditional zoning approach that presup-
poses and, in effect, endorses development of all land in one
way or another. Existing-use zoning provides, in short, a mech-
anism to let communities keep what they have - both the pre-
vailing uses of private land and the character of its
surroundings.33 It promotes a new land ethic of stability in
land use patterns, except where changes in use would serve a
compelling public interest.34
33. Professor Lefcoe writes that even strict limitations on private develop-
ment rights do not:
diminish the strength of private ownership. In removing the preroga-
tives from the land promoter and home builder, the law places new
rights in the hands of occupiers and homeowners. It favors the owner
who has made an investment in a building and, perhaps, a way of life,
over the real estate entrepreneur. By diminishing the right to de-
velop, the law enhances the right to present use and enjoyment.
Lefcoe, The Right to Develop Land The German and Dutch Experience, 56 OR.
L. REv. 31, 32 (1977).
34. This comprehensive land use planning, necessary to preserve the over-
all character of the country, is well known in Europe, which reached the stage
of dense population long before the United States. The Federal Republic of
Germany, for example, channels new construction and developments to ex-
isting intense-use areas or to lesser developed areas that are particularly suited
for more intensive use. The state permits existing uses to continue indefi-
nitely on the remaining land, which constitutes the greater part of the coun-
try. Undeveloped land outside of designated Bauland (building-land) areas is
set aside to remain, more or less permanently, what it always has been - open
space. Id. at 31-55; R. DOLZEB, supra note 22, at 33-45.
Lefcoe noted while flying over Germany:
In corridors that could have been developed with thousands of one-
family houses, there is forest (almost invariably without the second
homes which mar Northern California) and farm land .... There are
no billboards even along the ribbons of the Autobahn. All of this has
been achieved with minimal public intervention because private land-
owners have no right to build in undeveloped areas.
Lefcoe, supra note 33, at 46.
In upholding the West German land use regulation program against con-
stitutional challenge, the German Constitutional Court wrote:
We cannot agree with plaintiff's argument that the market for rural
land must be as free as the transfer of all other forms of 'capital.' The
fact that the given soil is vital for society and cannot be enlarged does
not allow entrusting its use to the incalculable market of free forces
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Zoning for existing use supposes that such use generally is
suitable, and that, as a general matter, owners are not currently
wasting the potential of their land. In the open space areas that
existing-use zoning would preserve, existing legal uses might
include agriculture, forestry, watershed, hunting, fishing, view-
shed, "buffer," and non-consumptive outdoor recreation. These
certainly are not economically wasteful uses: People have long
sought to acquire and hold open lands precisely for these kinds
of beneficial use. Nevertheless, the potential that such uses
have for yielding afinancial return can be far less than the fi-
nancial potential of uses that follow development. In exchange
for protecting the character of an owner's surroundings, ex-
isting-use zoning takes away development rights.
TAKING DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS IS NOT
IN ITSELF A "TAKING"
There may be "fundamental attributes of ownership"3 5
that government cannot take without paying just compensa-
tion,36 but the right to develop land is not one of them.3 7 In
and the complete discretion of the individual; a just legal and social
order leaves no choice but to assert the public interest in the land
more strongly than in other fields of property.
R. DoLzER, supra note 22, at 33 (translating and quoting the German Court).
35. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980).
36. The right to exclude others is "universally held to be a fundamental
element of the property right." Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,
179-80 (1979) (describing the right to exclude others as "one of the most essen-
tial sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as prop-
erty"); accord Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
433-37 (1982). The state can cut down even the right to exclude others, how-
ever, to the extent that it is not "essential to the use or economic value" of the
property. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-85 (1980); see
also Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715 (1987) (holding that abolition of both the
power to devise and possibility of descent is a "taking").
37. Indeed, at common law, the property owner had no absolute right to
develop land. Construction on non-fee interests was subject to the doctrine of
waste, including so-called ameliorative waste, which essentially prohibits life
and leasehold tenants from modifying the physical character of the reversion
or remainder. See 5 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY §§ 56-3 to -8, -17 to -19 (1989).
Furthermore, all lands, fee and non-fee alike, were (and are) subject to the
limitations of the common law of nuisance, which prohibits any otherwise law-
ful land use that substantially and unreasonably interferes with the reasonable
use of neighboring land. See 1 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, ToRTS 76-119
(2d ed. 1986). Other lands, such as lands under boatable waters, were subject
to prohibitions on any improvement that impeded passage of boats and vessels.
See Hargrave's Hale, De Jure Maris et Branchiorum Ejusdem, ch. III, re-
printed in S. MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE 374-75 (1888).
For a short history of Anglo-American land use regulation from the Nor-
man Conquest in 1066 until the early twentieth century, see Large, The
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Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,3 8 the
Supreme Court made it clear that the Constitution permits tak-
ig development rights without compensation.39
Penn Central posed the question whether New York City
Supreme Court and the Takings Clause: The Search for a Better Rule, 18
ENVTL. L. 3, 6-10 (1987) (noting that "despite occasional editorializing [to the
contrary] there has never been any absolute right of land ownership in any or-
ganized society"). For a comprehensive historical treatment of the same sub-
ject, see F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, supra note 14, at 51-138
(1973).
38. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
39. The Court noted that, in any event, the owners exaggerated the im-
pact of the existing use regulation in Penn Central. Id- at 136 n.33. For one
thing, the owners might have succeeded in getting approval for some more
limited use than the one they had proposed. The landmarks statute in Penn
Central also provided that the development rights could be "transferred" to
other parcels, a sweetener that mitigated the financial burdens the law im-
posed. Neither of these points, however, appear to be essential to the Court's
decision. I& at 136-37.
As a means of preserving open space, the transfer of development rights
(TDR) came under a major constitutional cloud in the subsequent case of Cali-
fornia Coastal Comm'n v. Nollan, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). In Nollan the Supreme
Court considered whether applicants for a building permit could be constitu-
tionally required to convey a public easement over their land as a condition of
the permit. The Court held that a condition cannot be attached to the grant-
ing of a building permit "unless the permit condition serves the same govern-
mental purpose" as the ban on building without a permit. Id. at 837.
Prior to Nollan, it appeared possible to steer development from one area
to another by inducing landowners to "transfer" the development rights from
parcels to be kept "as is" to other parcels in "receiving" zones located else-
where. Under such a TDR program, government could, for example, give de-
velopers an incentive to buy up rural development rights by letting them build
more densely on their urban parcels than the zoning laws otherwise would al-
low. The question raised by Nollan is whether government can force develop-
ers to transfer development rights before it will permit them to develop their
"receiving" land to the maximum possible legal density.
For TDR to work as a land preservation technique, the nominal zoning
density for the "receiving" parcels has to be substantially less than the govern-
ment really expects to permit. Otherwise, the government has nothing that itcan rationally "waive" as a bonus to developers who finance the purchase of
development rights on lands that the government wants to see preserved. In
Nollan, however, the Court specifically condemned such "leveraging of the po-
lice power [by] stringent land-use regulation which the State then waives to
accomplish other purposes.... ." Id at 837 n.5.
There must, in the words of Nollan, be an "essential nexus" between the
burden restrictions impose and the legitimate government purpose the restric-
tions are intended to advance. Id- at 837. That "essential nexus" is lacking in
TDR but is always present when existing-use zoning is employed to preserve
an area's traditional character. This is because existing-use zoning takes away
development rights from certain lands for the purpose of preserving the ex-
isting character of those same lands. By contrast, TDR takes away develop-
ment rights from certain lands for the purpose of preserving the existing
character of other lands.
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could validly apply its landmark preservation law to prohibit
proposed further development of the site occupied by a desig-
nated "landmark" - Grand Central Terminal. In effect, the
Terminal site was zoned for existing use. The owner, however,
desired to construct a high-rise office tower in the airspace
above it. In upholding the city's power to prohibit the proposed
development of the airspace, the Supreme Court noted that the
landmark preservation law "does not interfere in any way with
the present uses" of the land, even though it "restricted... the
exploitation of property interests. '40 The Court held that the
landmark designation:
not only permits but contemplates that [the owners] may continue to
use the property precisely as it has been used for the past 65 years: as
a railroad terminal containing office space and concessions. So the
law does not interfere with what must be regarded as Penn Central's
primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel. 4 1
The Court deemed the longstanding use to be a reasonable use
for constitutional purposes.4
Recently, in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,4 3
the Supreme Court again confirmed that government may take
development rights by regulation without paying compensation.
The Nollans, private owners, sought a permit to build on their
oceanfront land.44 The permitting authority was willing to
grant the permit only on the condition that the Nollans grant
an easement allowing the public to cross their land.45 The
Court struck down the easement condition because the condi-
tion did not advance the same governmental purpose as the
permit requirement. In its reasoning, however, the Court con-
firmed that, in pursuit of a legitimate public purpose,46 the
40. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136 (emphasis added).
41. Id- (emphasis added) At another point, the Court similarly empha-
sized that its holding was based on the owner's "present ability to use the Ter-
minal for its intended purposes and in a gainful fashion." Id- at 138 n.36.
42. "[O]n this record," the Court stated, "we must regard the New York
City law as permitting Penn Central not only to profit from the Terminal but
also to obtain a 'reasonable return' on its investment." Id. at 136 (emphasis ad-
ded). Because the only "evidence" of the Terminal's profitability showed that
the existing use was not profitable, id, at 119-20, the Supreme Court must have
deemed the landmarks law to allow a reasonable return based solely on the
fact that the law allowed the land to remain in its longstanding use.
43. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
44. Id. at 828.
45. Id- at 829.
46. In Penn Central the owners did not deny that the city had a justifying
public purpose for taking the development rights; namely that the "objective
of preserving structures and areas with special historic, architectural, or cul-
tural significance is an entirely permissible governmental goal." 438 U.S. at
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state "unquestionably would be able to deny the Nollans their
[building] permit if their new house (alone or by reason of cu-
mulative impact produced in conjunction with other construc-
tion) would substantially impede these purposes."47 Despite
the economic importance of the right to develop land, the
Supreme Court in Nollan and Penn Central has left no doubt
that a permanent restriction to existing uses is not per se a
compensable taking.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A PROFIT
Although Penn Central makes clear that there is no consti-
tutional right to develop land, the Supreme Court repeatedly
has asserted that a compensable taking would occur if land-use
regulations deny an owner "economically viable use."48 In a
129. The Court cited a number of cases in which it had recognized "that States
and cities may enact land-use restrictions or controls to enhance the quality of
life by preserving the character and desirable aesthetic features of a city." Id.
47. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. The Court's one qualification was that the de-
nial could not "interfere so drastically with the Nollans' use of their property
as to constitute a taking" by virtue of its economic impact. Id. at 836. The eco-
nomic impact test to determine a taking is the topic of the remainder of this
Article.
48. A land-use regulation effects a taking if it "denies an owner economi-
cally viable use of his land." Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
In Penn Central, the Court said only that a use restriction on real property
may "perhaps" constitute a taking "if it has an unduly harsh impact upon the
owner's use of the property." 438 U.S. at 127 (emphasis added). More re-
cently, however, the Court has referred to this "impact" factor in takings anal-
ysis by quoting the "denies... economically viable use" formulation of Agins.
See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485
(1987) (rejecting claim that state statute requiring 50% of the coal beneath cer-
tain structures to remain underground effected a taking); Nollan, 483 U.S. at
834 (invalidating state's conditioning grant of building permit on property
owner's transferring beach access easement to the state, because the condition
failed to further the same substantial government interest as the permit re-
quirement); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.
264, 296 (1981) (reasoning that enactment of statute limiting surface coal min-
ing operations was not shown to "prevent beneficial use of coal-bearing
lands").
The Court in Agins presented a two-pronged test of regulatory takings.
See supra note 16. In addition to the "economically viable use" criterion, the
Court stated that a use-regulation results in a taking ff- it "does not substan-
tially advance legitimate state interests." Id.
This Article focuses on the "economically viable use" prong of the Agins
two-pronged test. Only the value-diminishing aspect of use regulations has
been problematic from a constitutional standpoint. No one seems to quarrel
with the proposition that "under our system of government, one of the state's
primary ways of preserving the public weal is restricting the uses individuals
can make of their property." Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 491. See Sax,
Property Rights in the U.S. Supreme Court" A Status Report, 7 UCLA J.
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parallel line of cases, the Court similarly has insisted that a reg-
ulation's "economic impact" and the extent of interference with
"investment-backed expectations" are factors having "particu-
lar significance" in takings analysis.4 9 Although the Court
never has specified what it means by the concept of economi-
cally viable use, it seems a fair surmise that it has something to
do with profit. Without at least a potential for profit, it is diffi-
cult to imagine how a use can be considered "viable" in any
normal economic sense. Thus, although owners do not have a
constitutional right to develop their land, the dicta suggest the
possibility of an even broader constitutional right - the right
to put property to profitable use.50
ENVTL. L. & PoL'y 139, 146-47 (1988) (stating that the Court "has in recent
years effectively approved a very broad range of permissible regulatory acts, as
long as they leave some economically viable use to the owner").
In Agins, for example, the unanimous Court commented approvingly on
local regulations designed to discourage the "premature and unnecessary con-
version of open-space land to urban uses." 447 U.S. at 261. "The specific zon-
ing regulations at issue are exercises of the city's police power to protect [its]
residents ... from the Mn effects of urbanization. Such governmental purposes
long have been recognized as legitimate." Id Among the public interest objec-
tives of the zoning provisions at issue were "protecting against ... air, noise
and water pollution, traffic congestion, destruction of scenic beauty, distur-
bance of the ecology and environment, hazards to geology, fire and flood, and
other demonstrated consequences of urban sprawl." Id at 261 n.8; see also
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 129 (upholding "land-use restrictions or controls to
enhance the quality of life by preserving the character and desirable aesthetic
features of a city").
49. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; see also Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587,
606 (1987) (upholding Aid to Families with Dependent Children requirement
that children's support payments be assigned to the state, as having, in reality,
no adverse economic impact on claimant's investment-backed expectations);
Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 713-14 (1987) (invalidating a provision of the In-
dian Land Consolidation Act that abrogated an individual's rights to pass on
property to heirs or devisees); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475
U.S. 211, 224-25 (1986) (stating that statute requiring withdrawing employers
to pay proportional share of plan's unfunded vested benefits was not a taking).
50. The Court's dicta sometimes explicitly refer to profit, suggesting, for
example, that a use regulation would effect a taking if the uses remaining to
the owner are not "gainful," Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138 n.36, or "produc-
tive," United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126 nA
(1985), or if they are "commercially impracticable.., to continue." Keystone
Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 495-96. In Penn Central, the Court "regarded" the
longstanding existing use as giving the owner the opportunity "not only to
profit from the Terminal but also to obtain a 'reasonable return' on its invest-
ment." 438 U.S. at 136; see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436 (1982) (stating that "[a]lthough deprivation of the right
to use and obtain a profit from property is not, in every case, independently
sufficient to establish a taking... it is clearly relevant" (noting Andrus v. Al-
lard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979)).
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The suggestion that there is a constitutional right to make
a profit from property traces back to Justice Holmes' famous
"advisory opinion ' 51 in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon:
For practical purposes, the right to coal consists in the right to mine
it. What makes the right to mine coal valuable is that it can be exer-
cised with profit. To make it commercially impracticable to mine cer-
tain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes
as appropriating or destroying it.
5 2
Ever since Mahon the Supreme Court has nominally adhered to
its dictum that a use regulation can effect a taking if the cur-
tailment of use has an over-severe impact on the owner's eco-
nomic interest in the property. Rather than stress profits as
the sine qua non of "economically viable use," however, the
Court has said that the "interest in anticipated gains has tradi-
tionally been viewed as less compelling than other property-re-
lated interests."53  Rather than actually ever finding an
"economic impact" taking,54 moreover, the Court has hemmed
51. As the Court later called it in Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 484.
52. 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
53. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979). The Court reversed the dis-
trict court's holding that a prohibition on commercial transactions in eagle
feathers was a taking because the prohibition wholly deprived the owners of
the opportunity to earn a profit from relics incorporating the feathers. The
Court suggested, highly conjecturally, that the owners "might exhibit the arti-
facts for an admissions charge." Id.; accord Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436 (stating in
dicta that "deprivation of the right to use and obtain a profit from property is
not, in every case, independently sufficient to establish a taking").
In an analogous ratemaking context, the Court recently reiterated the
rule allowing price control regulations to "limit stringently the return recov-
ered on investment, for investors' interests provide only one of the variables
in the constitutional calculus of reasonableness." FCC v. Florida Power Corp.,
480 U.S. 245, 253 (1987) (emphasis added). Although imposing a "confiscatory"
rate is a taking of property under the fifth amendment, the Court noted that
the affected owners "have not contended, nor could it be seriously argued, that
a rate providing for the recovery of fully allocated cost, including the actual
cost of capital, is confiscatory." Id. At least in the ratemaking context, owners
therefore clearly do not have any constitutional right to receive a profit over
and above their costs. Indeed, the Court has left open the question of whether
owners necessarily are entitled even to recover their costs. Id. at 254 n.7.
54. Neither of the two "regulatory takings" found by the Supreme Court
to date were based on economic impact, both instead were based on the failure
of the governmental action to substantially further legitimate state interests.
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 438 U.S. 825, 837 (1987); Hodel v. Irving,
481 U.S. 704, 717-18 (1987); see supra note 46. Both of these cases probably are
better understood as turning on an application of traditional "economic due
process" analysis. See Humbach, supra note 16, at 341-47 (concluding that
"traditional economic due process review was at least part of what the
Supreme Court was doing in several of its takings cases").
In Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414-16, the Supreme Court said that the use restric-
tion in question went so far as to constitute a "taking." The holding in Mahon,
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the economic impact test with a daunting array of limitations.
One important limitation is the principle that a compensa-
ble taking does not result merely because a use restriction "de-
prives a property owner of the most profitable use of his
property. ' 55 Similarly, the fact that a regulation renders sub-
stantial portions of a landholding useless will not establish a
taking as long as the property as a whole retains economically
viable use.56 As the Court explained in Andrus v. Allard, "de-
nial of one traditional property right does not always amount to
a taking. At least where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of
however, was premised on economic due process analysis and not the takings
clause. Id at 413. The Court subsequently declared that the portion of the
Mahon opinion discussing the takings clause was merely an "advisory opin-
ion." Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 484.
55. United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958);
accord Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979) (stating that denying property
owners the most profitable use of their property is not "dispositive" in taking
cases); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978)
(reasoning that property owners still were able to obtain a "reasonable return"
on their property); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962)
(holding that "[if this ordinance is otherwise a valid exercise of the town's po-
lice powers, the fact that it deprives the property of its most beneficial use
does not render it unconstitutional"); see also Pennell v. City of San Jose, 108
S. Ct. 849, 852-53 (1988) (refusing to rule a city rent control law facially invalid
on a takings clause claim).
Indeed, the quotation in the text severely understates the power of gov-
ernment to prohibit property uses without effecting a taking or raising a right
to just compensation. The Court has used terms such as "complete destruc-
tion," "wholly useless," and "nearly the same effect as the complete destruc-
tion of [the owner's] right" in describing the line between regulation and
taking. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127-28 (citing respectively Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960), Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter,
209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908), Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414
(1922)). In a recent case upholding a right of compensation for temporary reg-
ulatory takings, Justice Rehnquist appeared to accept that, to constitute a tak-
ing, a regulation must deny the landowner "all use" of the property. First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
321 (1987).
56. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497-98
(1987) (holding that coal required by law to remain unmined did not "consti-
tute a separate segment of property for takings law purposes"); Penn Central,
438 U.S. at 130-31 (stating that "'[tiaking' jurisprudence does not divide a sin-
gle parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a
particular segment have been entirely abrogated"); accord Gorieb v. Fox, 274
U.S. 603, 608 (1927) (upholding set-back restrictions and stating that "zoning
laws prescribing.., the height of buildings... and the extent of the area to be
left open for light and air... are, in their general scope, valid under the fed-
eral Constitution"); see also Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184,
1192-93 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (upholding use regulation prohibiting construction on
part of a parcel, even though the prohibition caused "some diminution in
value" of owners' land), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982).
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property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is
not a taking because the aggregate must be viewed in its
entirety."5 7
It is not enough, moreover, that a regulation's economic
impact merely is severe. For a regulatory taking to occur a reg-
ulation must interfere with an owner's "reasonable, invest-
ment-backed expectations."58 There is, accordingly, no taking if
a regulation only interferes with a "unilateral expectation or an
abstract need."59 Perhaps most importantly, the onus is on the
owner to show concrete facts indicating that the regulation
leaves no possibility of economically viable use6° - a "heavy
57. 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979); accord Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 497.
In Andrus, the Court held that a total ban on selling or otherwise trading in
eagle parts did not result in a compensable taking even though the owners re-
tained only the rights to possess and transport the property. 444 U.S. at 67-68.
58. The "investment-backed expectations" factor first appeared in Penn
Centra4 438 U.S. at 124, 127-28. The Court adopted the wording, if not the con-
cept, from Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethi-
cal Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1233
(1967) (stating that the Court will inquire "whether or not the measure can
easily be seen to practically deprive the claimant of some distinctly perceived,
sharply crystallized investment-backed expectation"). In Ruckelshaus v. Mon-
santo Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984), the Court treated the "investment-backed ex-
pectations" factor as an independent test, holding that the regulatory
deprivations in Monsanto did not constitute takings in those circumstances
when the owner's expectations were deemed to be not "reasonable." Id. at
1005-14; accord Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 226-27
(1986) (stating that employers required to fund a proportionate part of a multi-
employer pension fund from which they were withdrawing "had sufficient no-
tice.., that withdrawal itself might trigger additional financial obligations").
Sometimes, as in Penn Centra4 the Court refers to the expectations in ques-
tion as "distinct investment-backed expectations." 438 U.S. at 124 (emphasis
added). More recently, the Court has chosen the phrase "reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations." See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 495
(quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)); Monsanto,
467 U.S. at 1005. The difference in wording, however, is without any apparent
intended difference in meaning. See generally Mandelker, Investment-Backed
E 7pectations: Is There a Taking?, 31 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 29-37
(1987) (discussing lower federal court and state court decisions that applied the
investment-backed expectations factor in takings analysis).
59. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1005 (quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc.
v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980)).
60. See, e.g., MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S.
340, 349-52 (1986) (declining to reach takings question because holdings of
lower courts left open "possibility that some development will be permitted");
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) (noting that parties
presented "no evidence... that the prohibition of further mining will reduce
the value of the lot in question"); see also Pennell v. City of San Jose, 108 S.
Ct. 849, 857 (1988) (stating that the case did not "present a sufficiently con-
crete factual setting for the adjudication of the takings claim"); Williamson v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186-94 (1985) (holding claim not ripe because
[Vol. 74:339
EXISTING-USE ZONING
burden"61 to prove a negative that has evolved into a limitation
of practically insurmountable proportions.
In view of these limitations, the Supreme Court is not
likely to hold that a land use regulation is a taking on economic
impact grounds except, in its words, "under extreme circum-
stances. ' 62 Laws to preserve open space and natural areas,
however, can present the "economic impact" issue in a new and
significantly more extreme regulatory context than most land
use regulations of the past.63
property owners had failed to apply for zoning variance); Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 294-98 (1981) (reasoning
that "constitutionality of statutes ought not be decided except in actual factual
setting that makes such a decision necessary").
61. Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 493.
62. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126
(1985).
63. Regulations prohibiting the filling of wetlands, for example, have met
with a mixed reception. Compare Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n,
151 Conn. 304, 311, 197 A.2d 770, 773 (1964) (stating that "change of zone to
flood plain district froze the area into a practically unusable state"); State v.
Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 716 (Me. 1970) (holding that restriction on filling wet-
lands deprived landowners of "reasonable use of their property"); Morris Land
Improvement Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 557-58, 193 A.2d 232,
243 (1963) (noting that land use was "rendered practically impossible by the
almost prohibitory filling and removal regulations") with Graham v. Estuary
Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374, 1382 (Fla.) (upholding denial of development
permits on the ground that property owner's development "would result in an
adverse impact on the surrounding area"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981);
Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 17-18, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (1972) (stat-
ing that "an owner of land has no absolute and unlimited right to change the
essential natural character of his land").
Justice Brennan expressed considerable doubt about the constitutionality
of preserving open space and scenic vistas by regulation, without compensa-
tion, in his dissenting opinion in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450
U.S. 621 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting):
From the property owner's point of view, it may matter little whether
his land is condemned or flooded, or whether it is restricted by regula-
tion to use in its natural state, if the effect in both cases is to deprive
him of all beneficial use of it.... It is only logical, then, that govern-
ment action other than acquisition of title, occupancy, or physical in-
vasion can be a "taking," and therefore a de facto exercise of the
power of eminent domain, where the effects completely deprive the
owner of all or most of his interest in the property.
I& at 652-53 (emphasis added).
Notably, however, Justice Brennan used words suggesting that, to consti-
tute a taking, the impingement of the regulation must leave no use, or virtu-
ally no use, whatsoever. Id (requiring that regulation must "deprive [the
owner] of all beneficial use" and "completely deprive the owner of all or most
of his interest"). Similarly, Justice Rehnquist recently described inverse con-
demnation of property by referring to government acts that "destroy its value
entirely." First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Ange-
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Land use regulations prior to the 1970s primarily consisted
of zoning and subdivision controls that accepted the premise
that regulated land should be legally available for development
in some manner or another.64 In contrast, a comprehensive
plan designed to balance open space with more intensive uses,
and to steer new development exclusively to designated build-
ing areas, would do much more. The whole idea of balance is to
preserve a line between urban and non-urban, to keep develop-
ment from polka-dotting the entire landscape. A balance can
be achieved only if the natural, open space, or even wilderness
characteristics of the countryside can be retained. For a com-
prehensive plan to preserve appreciable blocks of open land,
the property of many owners must remain "as is."
As Penn Central demonstrates, profit and preservation are
not per se incompatible. As long as the land can provide the
owner with a "gainful" economic return in its existing use,65
Supreme Court precedent permits regulations that prohibit
owners from enlarging the existing intensity of use. Regula-
tions that keep land in such traditionally gainful uses as farm-
ing, ranching, or forestry, therefore, should easily withstand
challenge under the takings clause. The fact that the owner
could make a greater profit in a more developed use is, in the
words of the Court, "not dispositive.16 6
Although Penn Central held that the land's existing use
was a constitutionally sufficient use, the existing use in ques-
tion was, to be sure, the owner's "primary expectation concern-
ing the use of the parcel." 67 The more difficult case, not yet
squarely faced by the Court, would be posed by the owner who
buys with no desire whatever to maintain the existing uses of
the land - whose interest in the land is solely as a develop-
ment site.
PERMISSIBLE LIMITATIONS ON LAND USE AND THE
MARKET "RATCHET"
The pattern is becoming familiar: A speculator buys a
les, 482 U.S. 304, 316-17 (1987) (quoting Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 166, 177-78 (1871) (emphasis added)).
64. See F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECION 795-96 (1984) (noting that increases in land use densities once
were seen as inevitable and desirable).
65. See supra note 50.
66. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979).




piece of undeveloped land - for example, a legally protected
wetland. The purchase price far exceeds the value of the land
in its current and historic use. Rather, it reflects the worth of
the land as a potential development site.68 The buyer applies
for the permits required in order to fill the wetland and build,
and perhaps for rezoning or a variance from current land-use
restrictions. Because the buyer paid an elevated price, the land
cannot possibly provide a reasonable financial return in its
natural wetland condition. Stressing this, the buyer argues
that denying the permits would be a "taking. " 6 9 If the govern-
ment wants to preserve the wetland, the argument goes, it can
do so, but only if it is willing to purchase the land at the price
the land can command as a development site.70
Lands that owners have been content to hold as natural or
open space for decades now are being sold at prices several
times their value in their existing or historic uses.71 Open
68. Although the selling price of such land presumably would be less than
the land's value as an already approved development site, market bidding for
prized development locations easily could cause the selling price to reflect at
least part of the anticipated development site value.
69. See, e.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 383-84
(1988) (involving plaintiff's taking claim based on denial of permit to develop
wetlands, thus substantially decreasing the value of the property). The plan-
ning board, zoning appeals board, or other governmental decision-making body
may be strongly disinclined to approve the development. The developer can
sue for money damages, however, and even impose personal liability on the
government officials who deny the permits if the court later holds such denial
to be unlawful. See, e.g., A.A. Profiles, Inc. v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 850 F.2d
1483, 1488 (11th Cir. 1988) (awarding property owner damages when zoning
measures were deemed "confiscatory"). This puts the balance of power heav-
ily on the side of the developer. See Canan & Pring, Studying Strategic Law-
suits Against Public Participation: Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative
Approaches, 22 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 385, 385 (1988) (discussing "social, legal, and
political impacts of multimillion dollar lawsuits filed against citizens or groups
for advocating a viewpoint on a public issue in a governmental decisional pro-
cess"); Canan & Pring, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 35
Soc. PROBS. 506, 506 (1988) (noting attempts to use civil tort action to stifle
political expression and how such lawsuits affect political values and participa-
tion in American society).
The balance of power can have a strong influence in outcomes. Because a
recovery of damages by the developer could be a personal catastrophe for local
officials, the tilt presumably favors development in all cases falling in the ar-
guable or "borderline" category.
70. The root of this argument is the famous broad dictum of Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). The Court stated- "[A] strong public
desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the
desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change."
Id. at 416.
71. See, e.g., GOVERNORS TASK FORCE ON NORTHERN FOREST LANDs AND
USDA FOREST SERV., NORTHERN FOREST LANDS STUDY REPORT 9 (Draft of
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space or "raw" land can command high prices because buyers
are willing to pay not merely for the land's present adaptations
for use, but also for its development potential. The market
value of land can have, in other words, two distinct compo-
nents: the basic existing-use value and a development-site pre-
mium.72 As buyers speculate on development potential, the
market value of open land escalates.73
Regulations designed to preserve the existing character of
land will tend, if anything, to deflate land prices. These
regulations strip the land of its speculative value based on de-
velopment potential. For long-term owners, the effect of pres-
ervation regulations is to reduce the opportunity to make a
speculative profit. For more recent buyers, those who paid the
escalated prices, use regulations may even cause a substantial
capital loss. Either way, the economic impact can be
dramatic. 74
Oct. 5, 1989), writing of the development threats to the 26 million acres of for-
est running across the northern tier of Maine, New Hampshire, New York,
and Vermont:
mhe market value of forest land for recreation and development con-
tinues to rise, in some places far exceeding the value of the land for
timber production.... Buyers are willing to pay prices many times
higher than the value of the land for growing timber. Lakeshore,
river frontage, scenic ridges, and land with access to major highways
command the highest prices and are in greatest demand.. . . As
timberland owners respond to changing economic conditions, tracts of
land that are more valuable for uses other than timber production are
being sold to people with different interests.
72. Only the existing-use value represents the social opportunity cost of
developing land for a new and different use and, in a perfect market, no devel-
oper should have to pay more than this existing-use value. Nevertheless, be-
cause parcels of land are not fungible or movable, land markets probably
never can operate so "perfectly" as to prevent the occurrence of development
site premiums. In any case, it is a familiar phenomenon that lands that appear
to be good prospects for near-term development tend to be priced higher than
the values they would have based solely on their existing uses. Development
site premiums thus probably are the norm for development site lands. See
generally A. SCHMID, CONVERTING LAND FROM RURAL TO URBAN USE §§ II-III,
at 24-34 (1968) (discussing development site prices in rural development).
The NORTHERN FOREST LANDS STUDY REPORT, supra note 71, at 22, pro-
vides a dramatic example:
[A large real estate corporation] bought forest land with no lakeshore
or water access for $100 per acre. [The corporation] then subdivided it
and marketed it as vacation property for more than $300 per acre....
The change in the market value was not accompanied by any change
other than subdivision.
73. NORTHERN FOREST LANDS STUDY REPORT, supra note 71, at 22.
74. The economic impact of existing-use zoning can be dramatic, but it
also can be exaggerated. Exaggeration is particularly likely if prices from a
few actual sales for development are simply extrapolated to all comparable un-
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Apart from their dampening effect on speculative prices,
however, preservation regulations effect no real change. In-
deed, real change is precisely what such use regulations are in-
tended to prevent. They leave the land's existing-use value
intact because the land can continue to provide exactly the
same benefits after the adoption of the regulations as before.
Even so, the benefits from the existing uses may seem economi-
cally inadequate if the owner paid - or could have exacted - a
development site price for the land. The critical question is
whether, by eliminating speculative values, preservation regu-
lations constitute a compensable "taking."
As we have seen, a mere reduction of land value, specula-
tive or otherwise, does not constitute a taking;75 the regulation
developed lands in the geographic market. Such a global extrapolation would
be valid only if, in the particular geographic market, there are buyers who are
ready to purchase all the comparable undeveloped lands at development site
prices at once - a most unlikely situation.
Where open country is being converted to developed uses at a rate of a
few percent per year, it could take decades for all the open space to actually
yield its potential development site value. For most parcels, the high improba-
bility of immediate development means that the present development-site
value is far less than the potential development-site value. To obtain the true
present value, it is necessary to discount the potential development-site value
by a factor that takes full account of the probable delay in actually realizing
on the potential. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(ii) (1989) (stating that a
valuation of development rights "must take into account ... an objective as-
sessment of how immediate or remote the likelihood is that the property...
would in fact be developed").
Consider, for example, a relatively fast growing county at an urban edge
in which farm acres are being subdivided and developed at a (fairly high) rate
of 2% per year. Even if some farms in the county are being sold to developers
at 500% of their agricultural values, any given farmer would have, on average,
only a 2% probability of collecting that 500% "value" in any given year. Based
on these numbers, existing-use zoning would cause only an average 10% dimi-
nution of the true present values of the developable farm lands in the market
area (2% x 500% = 10%).
By taking proper account of the market's limited absorption capabilities,
the real economic impact of existing-use zoning turns out on average to be
only a few percentage points of value. Isolated parcels may sustain demonstra-
bly greater losses in value - for example, parcels that are already under con-
tract to sell at development site prices. The impacts on these parcels would be
offset, however, by even greater discounting on other parcels whose selection
by the market lottery is even further deferred. See Akers v. Commissioner,
799 F.2d 243, 245 (6th Cir. 1986) (analogizing the comparison between potential
development value and actual realized development value as "the difference
between the worth of a gravid or potentially gravid sow and the postpartum
worth of a sow-cuin-shoats").
75. "The decisions," according to the Supreme Court, "uniformly reject
the proposition that diminution in property value, standing alone, can estab-
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must deny an owner "economically viable use" of the land.76
Although the concept of economically viable use frequently has
been cited as a criterion of "taking,' '77 the Supreme Court
never has equated it with financial profitability as such. There
is good reason for avoiding any such equation, and that reason
is plain enough: Whether a particular remunerative use of land
is financially profitable depends on how much the owner has
paid for the land.78
Even land in its natural state can provide a respectable fi-
lish a 'taking."' Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131
(1978).
The Court reasoned:
[I]mpairment of the market value of real property incident to other-
wise legitimate government action ordinarily does not result in a tak-
ing. At least in the absence of an interference with an owner's legal
right to dispose of his land, even a substantial reduction of the attrac-
tiveness of the property to potential purchasers does not entitle the
owner to compensation under the Fifth Amendment.
Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 15 (1984) (citations omit-
ted); see also Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (stating
that "government could hardly go on if to some extent values incident to prop-
erty could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the gen-
eral law").
Even while vigorously urging (in a dissenting opinion) a comparatively
larger protection of private property rights, Justice Rehnquist accepted that
there would be no taking if the regulations merely made the property in ques-
tion "'of little value' but did not completely extinguish the value." Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 513-14 (1987) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
76. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 48.
78. Profitability is, in other words, a relative concept, with profit depend-
ing on the relationship between the amount of return and the amount of in-
vestment. The Supreme Court has recognized that, for purposes of takings
clause analysis, it is hopelessly circular to establish the value of a regulated
asset by simply capitalizing the asset's projected returns when the very issue
at hand is determining a fair return. Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 109 S. Ct.
609, 616 n.5 (1989) (reasoning that "capital assets [could not] be valued by the
stream of income they produced because setting that stream of income was the
very object of the rate proceeding").
Even when owners receive more cash back than they put in, there still
may not be an economic "profit." The return must exceed the amount needed
for amortization of invested capital. This further return must equal at least
the amount the owner could have received from the next best alternative use
of the capital invested, or there still is no economic profit on the deal. An as-
set that does not depreciate in value, like land, presents a special case. There
is no amortization of the investment. In the case of non-depreciable land,
'therefore, economic profitability wholly depends on there being a net return
in excess of the "opportunity cost," the amount that could have been received
from the next best alternative use of the capital. See generally R. POSNErt,
supra note 17, § 1.1, at 9 (stating that economic rent is the "difference between
total revenues and total opportunity costs").
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nancial return, provided the owner has not paid too much for it.
Typical open space uses for which people often pay handsomely
include hunting, fishing, grazing, forestry, buffer, or aesthetic
enjoyment. Only when woodlands or wetlands are sold at
building lot prices do these natural uses seem trivial. It could
not follow, however, that a buyer has a constitutional right to
use raw land as a building site just because the buyer was will-
ing to pay "too much." If that were the rule then the mere bid-
ding up of sales prices in the market would ratchet up the
constitutionally guaranteed uses of land. The government's
power to regulate would be, in effect, at the mercy of private
market transactions.
EXISTING USE VS. POTENTIAL USE - "INVESTMENT-
BACKED EXPECTATIONS"
In assessing the impact of a land use restriction there is a
fundamental difference between existing use and potential fu-
ture use.79 Existing uses of land provide definite, physical bases
for specific expectations about the stream of future benefits a
parcel of land can produce. Potential use is an abstraction, an
image in the mind of the land entrepreneur.
Although conjectures about potential use exist only in peo-
ple's minds, such conjectures can have appreciable effects on
market prices. If land entrepreneurs guess that, by adding capi-
tal and labor, a parcel's projected stream of returns can be en-
larged, the parcel's market price may include a development
site premium over and above the land's existing-use value. This
speculative premium, however, is something very different
from the value attributable to the parcel's existing uses. It is,
bluntly, the difference between an investment and a bet.
There is solid ground for concluding that there is a consti-
tutional difference between an investment and a bet. As the
Court has said in Penn Central and repeatedly since, the prop-
erty expectations that the takings clause protects from extreme
economic impacts are "reasonable" or "distinct investment-
backed expectations."80 The Court has been willing to give a
fairly wide scope to the concept of "investment,"81 but it never
79. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136, 138 n.36.
80. Id. at 124; see supra note 58 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715 (1987) (defining the concept
of investment to possibly include the exchange made by the ancestors of the




has even hinted that the concept might include a speculator's
gamble that development could enlarge a currently projected
stream of returns.8 2 In other words, it is one thing to say that a
taking occurs when a regulation totally destroys existing land
uses. It is, however, something else again to conclude that com-
pensation is required when a regulation takes nothing except a
hope or expectancy about possible uses in the future.
The purpose of the takings clause, as the Court has often
said, is "to bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole."83 To apply this principle to
particular cases "necessarily requires a weighing of private and
public interests." 4 A private owner's interest in keeping some-
thing that exists in physical reality presents a far more obvious
case for constitutional protection as "property" than the private
interest in mere hopes.
Although speculators should not be treated arbitrarily,85 it
certainly does not follow that the takings clause should guaran-
tee their bets. A buyer may pay an elevated price with a view
to getting certain use restrictions relaxed, but it hardly can be
harsh for the government to retain the restrictions in force.
That was precisely the risk the buyer took.86 The Constitution
82. The lower court cases since Penn Central generally support the view
that the "investment-backed expectations" factor excludes speculative aspira-
tions from takings clause protection. For a careful review and discussion, see
Mandelker, supra note 58, at 29-37. One exception is Loveladies Harbor, Inc.
v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381 (1988), in which the court observed, without
discussion, that "plaintiffs' reasonable, investment-backed expectations have
been frustrated. Plaintiffs intended to purchase the land for development or
at least for resale." Id at 396.
83. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 227 (1986)
(quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)); see also Agins v.
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980) (stating that a taking requires a "determi-
nation that the public at large rather than a single owner, must bear the bur-
den of an exercise of state power in the public interest").
84. Agins, 447 U.S. at 261.
85. If, for example, the government takes a piece of raw land by eminent
domain, and the market value of the land reflects its potential for develop-
ment, the government must pay that market value. See Kirby Forest Indus.,
Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (stating that the measure of recovery
is the cash price a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller at the time of the
taking). In other words, the law protects a speculator's interest in a property's
potential just as fully as it protects a user's interest in what his property is -
once it has been determined that the property itself has been taken.
86. In Nollan, Justice Scalia suggested that if imposition of a particular
land use restriction would be invalid as against an existing owner, it likewise
would have to be invalid against a later buyer. 483 U.S. 825, 833 n.2 (1987). He
reasoned that "the prior owners must be understood to have transferred their
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should not guarantee that the speculator will win the bet.
The takings clause similarly does not prevent the gov-
ernment from enacting new restrictions that apply to land al-
ready purchased by a developer. Even though such after-the-
purchase restrictions may be onerous on the buyer whose in-
tended use is foreclosed, the government's power to regulate
cannot be cut down by purely private transactions.8 7 If it were
otherwise, zoning codes never could have been constitutionally
imposed in the first place, current zoning could never be tight-
ened, and Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.88 would no longer be
good law.89
Whenever a buyer pays a premium over and above the
land's existing-use value, the buyer takes a calculated gamble
- a gamble that the planned change in use can be profitably
accomplished. Part of that gamble is the inherent risk that the
government may tighten the applicable regulations. As the
Supreme Court has said: "Those who do business in the regu-
lated field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed
by subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative end."90
The Court has found it particularly reasonable to expect regu-
latory change in a field of business that "has long been the
source of public concern and the subject of government
regulation."9'
Land development is an increasingly regulated field, and
every competent developer knows that the trend is toward ever
greater refinement of land use controls. When land is acquired
full property rights in conveying" the affected land. Id. at 833. Justice Scalia's
assumption is perfectly reasonable if the restriction in question was invalid at
the time of transfer. The example in the text, however, concerns a buyer hop-
ing to obtain relaxation of a valid use-restriction.
87. Justice Holmes said it best: "One whose rights, such as they are, are
subject to state restriction, cannot remove them from the power of the State
by making a contract about them. The contract will carry with it the infirmity
of the subject matter." Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349,
357 (1908); accord Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470, 502-06 (1987) (rejecting claim that statute impairs property owners' con-
tract with surface owners to waive liability for surface damage).
88. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). This is the landmark case upholding the constitu-
tionality of traditional zoning regulations.
89. As the Supreme Court expressed this point: "[Tihe submission that
[owners] may establish a 'taking' simply by showing that they have been de-
nied the ability to exploit a property interest that they heretofore had believed
was available for development is quite simply untenable." Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978).
90. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 227 (1986)
(quoting FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958)).
91. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1007 (1984).
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for development, the buyer takes a known risk 92 - particularly
if the interval between purchase and actual development is
many months or even years.93 An expectation that there will
be no regulatory change in the interim simply is not a reason-
able expectation, "investment-backed" or otherwise.9 Until
land actually has been adapted to a potential use, any premium
paid by a buyer in anticipation of that use is not so much an
investment in "property" as an investment in hope - a "unilat-
eral expectation" 95 that the land's stream of earnings can be
enhanced.
In summary, land use regulations can affect market values
in two distinct ways: by limiting or prohibiting existing uses
and by cancelling hopes and conjectures about potential for
change. When a regulation bans the existing use of land, it sev-
ers an existing flow of benefits; it legally annihilates an ex-
isting state of fact. Because the advantage of the asset is
functionally destroyed, "property" is taken. A regulation that
merely prohibits development, by contrast, takes away at most
only a hope or expectancy. The benefit-producing asset is left
intact. Although a unilateral aspiration may no longer exist,
the "property" remains.
The distinction between existing-use and potential-use val-
ues is implicit in the "reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions" factor of the Supreme Court's "takings" analysis. It
supports the owner's quite normal and reasonable expectation
92. A buyer of riparian lands similarly takes the risk that the government
will exercise the navigation servitude to his or her detriment. See, e.g., United
States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 511 (1945) (recognizing no com-
pensable property interest in high-water level of river subject to federal gov-
ernment's power to make improvements for navigation); United States v.
Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 73-74 (1913) (holding that
there is no compensable property interest in navigable waters). The Supreme
Court also used this analogy in Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-26 (noting that
the Court upholds regulations that adversely affect property interests when
such regulations reasonably promote health, safety, and welfare).
93. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64-65 n.21 (1979) (holding that "[t]he
timing of acquisition ... is relevant to a takings analysis of appellee's invest-
ment-backed expectations").
94. See Connolly, 475 U.S. at 227; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125-26 (noting
that "'taking' challenges have also been held to be without merit.., when the
challenged governmental actions prohibited a beneficial use to which individ-
ual parcels had previously been devoted and thus caused substantial individu-
alized harm").
95. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005-06 (1983) (stating that
"a 'reasonable investment-backed expectation' must be more than a 'unilateral
expectation or an abstract need!" (quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc.
v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980))).
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that land can be beneficially used in the same condition as
when the owner sees it and buys it.96 It does not, however, re-
quire that the public fisc reimburse a speculative investment or
assure a speculative profit as the price of regulation. The re-
sulting balance protects the core interest of every owner while
the police power to promote the public welfare remains
unimpaired.
CONCLUSION
As the country fills and people live closer and closer to-
gether, it becomes increasingly apparent that we all have a
shared stake in the condition and future of our national
landbase. The American landscape, though divided into many
private plots, is seen more and more as the shared heritage of
all. The character of the land and of communities and regions,
and the preservation of dwindling open spaces, are shared con-
cerns. A new land ethic of planning and stability has replaced
the pioneer land ethic of autonomy and change.
If we wish to preserve existing patterns of land use and de-
velopment, we must employ some form of existing-use zoning
in the relatively undeveloped, non-urbanized areas that remain.
There is no constitutional barrier to existing-use zoning.
Supreme Court "takings" cases provide no basis to conclude
that there is a constitutional right to develop land. On the con-
trary, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City
and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the Court em-
braced exactly the opposite view. There is, however, a constitu-
tional right to have an "economically viable use" of land.
Although the Supreme Court has not defined the concept
of "economically viable use," it is clear that the term does not
necessarily mean a profitable rate of return on any given
amount of invested capital. There is no general constitutional
requirement that use-restrictions must leave every owner with
a use that will yield a profitable rate of return based upon the
amount that the particular owner paid for the land. Specula-
96. This actually was the only issue decided by the Court in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). The property owner's expectation
was the right to mine certain coal. Id at 414. The only possible beneficial use
of this right, at its creation and at the time of the case, was to mine the coal
for profit. The invalid legislative prohibition on extracting the coal eliminated
the only existing use that provided a basis for a reasonable investment-backed
expectation. Unlike the abstract potential for benefit that the speculative
owner hopes to reduce to a reality, the person who buys for an existing use
seeks only that profit potential that is founded on an existing state of fact.
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tive transactions bidding up land prices do not ratchet up con-
stitutionally guaranteed uses that are immune from
governmental land use regulation.
Regulations limiting land to its existing uses meet the
Supreme Court's test of economically viable use as long as the
land retains some appreciable benefit in that existing use. The
government's power to regulate or prohibit modifications to en-
able new future uses, without compensation, has not been ques-
tioned by the Court.
It therefore is constitutionally permissible, according to the
Supreme Court cases, to preserve the overall character of our
national landbase and to prevent pockets of development from
scattering across the countryside. Existing-use zoning can
channel new construction projects to already developed areas,
and the open lands in between can be retained as they are. The
new land ethic of planning and stability need not founder on
the property protections of our fundamental law.
